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COMMENTS
MUNICIPAL LEASE-PURCHASE AGREEMENTS: A VIRGINIA
PERSPECTIVE
America's state and local governments are in a fiscal vise.1 Federal in-
tergovernmental aid reached a high water mark in fiscal 1979,2 but subse-
quent cutbacks by President Reagan and Congress brought the era of
rapid growth in federal domestic spending to a screeching halt in 1981
with reductions of over fifty-three billion dollars in budgetary authority
and thirty-five billion dollars in budgetary outlays.3 Local governments
have responded by taking one of three fiscal paths: (1) forced austerity,
resulting in school and library closings, deteriorating infrastructure, elim-
ination of mass-transit systems and benefit and personnel cuts;4 (2) an
increased dependence on local tax sources for financing of assets neces-
sary to provide public services; 5 or (3) some combination of the two previ-
ous alternatives. As a result, states and localities no longer spend enough
on the repair and replacement of existing public facilities.'
With this decline of revenues and increase of cutbacks in federal aid to
states and localities, turmoil was concurrently experienced in the munici-
pal bond market, the traditional vehicle of local government finance.7
1. "A diminishing flow of federal aid to cities, a diminishing flow of state dollars to cities,
and a growing aversion to property taxes all put incredible pressure on municipal govern-
ment." Lamm, The Fiscal Squeeze on Local Government, 13 CURRENT MUN. PROBS. 17, 17
(1986).
2. Van Horn & Raimondo, Living with Less: New Jersey Copes with Federal Aid Cut-
backs, PuB. BUDGETING & FIN., Spring 1983, at 41.
3. Id.
4. Bisk, State and Municipal Lease-Purchase Agreements: A Reassessment, 7 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 521, 521 (1984); see also Evans, What Will Cities and Counties Do When
There Is Less Money from the Federal Government?, 12 CURRENT MUN. PROBS. 199 (1985).
5. See Van Horn & Raimondo, supra note 2, at 43. Apparently, the federal aid cutbacks
have been "across the board," with the localities which are the "worse off" receiving no
leniency with respect to reductions in federal assistance. See id. at 56 n.10.
6. Petersen, Creative Capital Financing in the State and Local Sector, PUB. BUDGETING
& FIN., Winter 1982, at 73, ("State and local capital spending, which grew during the de-
cades of the '50s and '60s, declined in real terms throughout the '70s and has been particu-
larly depressed in the early '80s.").
7. See Flynn, The "Creative" Revolution in Municipal Finance, 11 CURRENT MUN. PROBS.
460, 460 (1985) ("As inflation skyrocketed, the traditional 'general obligation' debt was over-
taken . . . ."); Lamm, supra note 1, at 18 ("[U]nder the [Reagan] administration's plan,
estimates indicate that 62 percent of all municipal bonds would lose their tax-exempt sta-
tus."); Molchan, Reform of the Municipal Bond Market: Alternatives to Tax-Exempt Fi-
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Thus, local officials began and continue to seek new techniques to finance
needed public goods and services.8 This search is frustrated, however, by
the legal restrictions imposed on the power of localities to incur indebted-
ness9 by state constitutional debt limitations.1" Such debt limitations,
typically added by amendment to a state's constitution, place restraints
on municipal borrowing power in order to protect local taxpayers from
legislative fiscal recklessness.1" Thus, local governmental entities must
struggle to meet the needs of their citizens while complying with legal
restrictions on debt.
Increasingly, local officials have turned to the lease-purchase agree-
ment 2 as a means of resolving their fiscal/constitutional dilemma. 13
Lease-purchase agreements are rental contracts that pass title to the
lessee at the end of the lease either automatically or through the exercise
by the lessee of a purchase option.1 4 Proponents of lease-purchasing argue
nancing, 15 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PRoBs. 233, 234 (1980) ("[Tlhe combination of inflation,
recession, tight credit, and urban unrest began to take its toll [on the municipal bond
market].").
8. See Bisk, supra note 4, at 521; see also Flynn, supra note 7, at 462-63; Petersen, supra
note 6, at 73-74.
9. See Magnusson, Lease-Financing By Municipal Corporations As a Way Around Debt
Limitations, 25 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 377 (1957).
10. See, e.g., VA. CONST. art. VII, § 10 (prohibiting counties from contracting debt which is
payable from revenues not collectible in the current year except in accordance with certain
specified means).
11. Bisk, supra note 4, at 521; see also Magnusson, supra note 9, at 381 (discussion of the
origin of debt limitations). See generally Nichols, Debt Limitations and the Bona Fide
Long-Term Lease with an Option to Purchase: Another Look at Lord Coke, 9 URB. LAW.
403 (1977) (discussion of historical background and evolution of municipal debt limitations);
Note, Power of Municipality to Exceed Debt Limit, 14 COLUM. L. REV. 70 (1914) (discussion
of split in judicial authority on the definition of "municipal debt"); Note, Constitutional
Law-Recent Interpretation of Ohio's Limitation on Indebtedness, 6 OHIO ST. U.L.J. 297
(1940) (discussion of Ohio's constitutional debt limits); Comment, Municipal Corpora-
tions- Constitutional Debt Limitations-What Constitutes a Debt, 34 MINN. L. REv. 360
(1950) (analysis of case holding that bond issue did not create an indebtedness within mean-
ing of constitutional debt limitations).
12. See infra notes 22-34 and accompanying text. See generally Comment, Municipal
Corporations-Circumventing Municipal Debt Limitations, 48 MICH. L. REV. 1016 (1950)
(comparison of views held by Indiana and Michigan with respect to lease-purchase agree-
ments); Annotation, Lease of Property By Municipality or Other Political Subdivision,
With Option to Purchase Same, As Evasion of Constitutional or Statutory Limitation of
Indebtedness, 145 A.L.R. 1362 (1943) (supplementing annotation of same title at 71 A.L.R.
1318 (1931)).
13. See Petersen, supra note 6, at 85 ("It has been estimated that approximately $1 bil-
lion in tax-exempt leases were executed in 1981 as compared to $250 million in 1977.").
Apparently, the popularity of lease-purchasing has been increasing since before the start of
the current local fiscal crisis. See Rogers, Municipal Debt Restrictions and Lease-Purchase
Financing, 49 A.B.A.J. 49, 49 (1963) ("An increasingly popular tool of municipal finance is
the lease-purchase contract.").
14. Bisk, supra note 4, at 522.
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that such contracts fall outside the ambit of constitutional debt limita-
tions because of their contingent nature. 15 Additionally, lease-purchasing
allows localities to avoid the high fixed costs and risks of a general bond
issue.16
Critics of lease-purchasing argue that such contracts are merely facades
masking unconstitutional general obligation debt.17 They point to the
paradox of classifying the rental payments under such arrangements as
municipal debt for federal tax purposes 8 while, at the same time, treating
such payments as current operating expenses, instead of general obliga-
tion debt, in order to comply with state constitutional debt limitations.19
This comment initially examines the structure, economic utility, and
constitutionality of municipal lease-purchase agreements and then seeks
to fill a void of information on the propriety of implementing such agree-
ments in Virginia.20 The comment concludes that lease-purchasing repre-
sents a solution to the current fiscal crisis experienced by local govern-
ments, and that lease-purchasing is constitutional with respect to Virginia
localities, if enacted pursuant to two recent opinions of the Attorney
General. 21
I. AN OVERVIEW OF LEASE-PURCHASING
A. The Mechanics of Lease-Purchasing: The Actors and Their Roles
1. The Structure of the Lease-Purchase Agreement
Technically speaking, a lease-purchase agreement is not a lease.2 ' In a
simple true lease in which a governmental unit is the lessee, there are
usually only two actors: the lessee and the lessor.2 The lessor, normally a
manufacturer, provides use of an asset to the lessee for a stipulated pe-
15. Most lease-purchase agreements provide that the obligation of a governmental unit to
make payments is contingent upon sufficient appropriation of funds to make such pay-
ments. See A GUIDE TO MUNICIPAL LEASING 67 (A. Vogt & L. Cole ed. 1983) [hereinafter
GUIDE]; see also infra notes 82-89 and accompanying text.
16. Bond issues generally require voter approval in a municipal referendum. Thus, locali-
ties may bear the cost of an election only to see the issue defeated. See Schickendantz,
Financing Through Municipal Leasing, 5 CURRENT MUN. PROBs. 329, 329 (1979).
17. Bisk, supra note 4, at 522.
18. The interest that lessors earn under lease-purchase contracts is not subject to federal
income taxation. I.R.C. § 103 (1986); see also infra notes 54-72 and accompanying text.
19. See Petersen, supra note 6, at 84-85.
20. "Attorneys, leasing companies and local governments have all experienced frustration
from lack of information and sources for information in the area of governmental leasing."
Mardikes, Cone & Horn, Governmental Leasing: A Fifty State Survey of Legislation and
Case Law, 18 URB. LAW. 1, 3 (1986).
21. See infra notes 96-115 and accompanying text.
22. GUIDE, supra note 15, at 29.
23. Id. at 6.
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riod of time in return for specified rental payments made at regular
intervals.24
In a municipal lease-purchase agreement, more actors are typically in-
volved than in the simple true lease and the structure of the arrangement
is also more complex. 25 The lessee acquires ownership as well as use of the
leased asset from the inception of the "lease" term, and the contract typi-
cally specifies a date on which title to the property passes from lessor to
lessee.2" Thus, the lease-purchase agreement is more akin to an install-
ment purchase or a conditional sale than it is to a true lease.27 In addi-
tion, if the lease-purchase agreement involves realty, it may actually con-
tain two leases: (1) a "ground lease" of municipal realty from the local
government to a leasing agent; and (2) the lease-purchase contract itself,
under which the municipality leases space as lessee in an improvement,
such as a school or firehouse, to be constructed upon the municipal
land.28 Lease-purchase agreements have also been used by municipalities
to acquire personalty such as telephone systems and water meters.2 9 Fi-
nally, the periodic payments established in the agreement must be di-
vided into principal and interest portions for the interest to qualify as
tax-exempt for federal income tax purposes.30
Bulman v. McCrane3 involved a typical lease-purchase agreement. In
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 3.
27. The Commissioner of Revenue has established criteria for identifying conditional
sales contracts and distinguishing them from true leases: (1) portions of the periodic pay-
ments are made specifically applicable to an ownership interest to be acquired by the lessee;
(2) the lessee acquires title upon payment of a stipulated amount of "rentals" which, under
the contract, he is required to make; (3) the total amount paid by the lessee constitutes an
inordinately large proportion of the total sum required to secure transfer of title; (4) the
agreed "rental" payments substantially exceed the current fair rental value, thus indicating
that such payments include an element other than compensation for use of the asset; (5) the
asset may be acquired under a purchase option at a price which is nominal in relation to the
value of the total payments to be made; and (6) some portion of the periodic payments is
specifically designated as interest. Rev. Rul. 55-540, 1955-2 C.B. 39, 41-42. Each of these
factors may be true with respect to a lease-purchase agreement. Indeed, one of the criteria
which must be met in order to qualify the interest portion of the periodic payments for
federal income tax exemption is that the agreement be structured as a conditional sale or an
installment purchase rather than as a true lease. See infra notes 67-68 and accompanying
text.
28. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Offner, 19 Cal. 2d 483, 122 P.2d 14 (1942) (proposed
agreements constituted a "lease" and "option to purchase" and did not violate constitu-
tional debt limit provision); County Bd. v. Brown, 229 Va. 341, 329 S.E.2d 468 (1985) (stat-
ute granting the county the discretion to lease any "unused lands" did not include land
being used as a parking lot, despite arguments that it was "underutilized" and the county
could profit by leasing it for development).
29. See Flynn, supra note 7, at 463.
30. See infra note 66 and accompanying text.
31. 64 N.J. 105, 312 A.2d 857 (1973).
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Bulman, an arrangement was proposed whereby the State of New Jersey
would take a twenty-five year lease on a building that was to be erected
by a developer on state-owned land and was to be used by the state as a
records storage center and printing facility.32 The state was to have the
option of purchasing the facility at a predetermined, progressively declin-
ing price during the tenth, fifteenth and twentieth years of the lease.33
Even if the state failed to exercise its option to purchase, title to the
building would pass to the state at the end of the lease term. 4 Thus, the
state would acquire use of the facility during the term of the lease and
ultimately would acquire title to the building through either the purchase
option or the automatic reversion clause.
2. Certificate of Participation Leases
Traditionally, lease-purchase agreements have been used by state and
local governments to acquire personal property such as equipment; the
amount financed usually is modest and the term for payment short, e.g.,
five years or less. 3 5 Financing for major improvements, expensive equip-
ment acquisitions, or real property acquisitions that require longer repay-
ment terms has not been widely available.3 ' The advent of the certificate
of participation (COP) lease, however, has facilitated the acquisition of
such items through lease-purchase financing3
A COP lease is a specific type of tax-exempt 38 lease-purchase agree-
ment in which fractional interests, or shares, in the agreement are created
and marketed either privately or publicly. 9 The shares may be few in
number, with each one representing a substantial fraction of the total fi-
nancing, or they may be smaller in amount, e.g., $5,000 each, in which
case the COP's would probably be marketed to the public.40 Each share
gives the investor a fractional interest in the periodic payments made by
the lessee during the lease-purchase term.41 In a COP lease, the lessee
and lessor enter into an agreement which is similar to the traditional
lease-purchase agreement, but which contains certain provisions unique
to the COP lease, such as a clause in which the lessee authorizes the crea-
tion of the fractional interests.
42
32. Id. at 107, 312 A.2d at 858.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. GUIDE, supra note 15, at 31.
36. Id.
37. Id. COP leasing has provided financing on projects valued up to $50 million. Id.
38. See infra notes 54-72 and accompanying text.
39. GUIDE, supra note 15, at 31.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 32.
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B. The Economics of Lease-Purchasing
Attractive financial benefits for both the government lessee and the in-
vestor/lessor are the primary reason for the emergence of lease-purchas-
ing as a practical public finance device.43 Through a lease-purchase agree-
ment, a local government can acquire immediately needed equipment or
office space with an affordable initial investment.4 Thereafter, each
''rental" payment increases the governmental unit's equity interest in the
asset until title ultimately passes to the lessee through the automatic re-
version provision or through the exercise of the nominal purchase op-
tion.45 The interest earned by the lessor is tax-exempt;46 in a competitive
market, lessors, who are often equipment manufacturers or developers,
will compete for a municipality's business which will force these tax sav-
ings back to the government in the form of lower periodic payments.47
Occasionally, governments must acquire midterm assets which cost too
much to fund from a single year's budget but which have an economic life
too short to finance with traditional municipal bonds.48 Lease-purchase
financing is an ideal method by which to spread the cost of such acquisi-
tions over several years.49 Moreover, if bond issues are secured by general
municipal revenues, they must be approved in many jurisdictions by a
majority of qualified voters in a municipal referendum.50 The expense and
risk of submitting the question to the voters may not be justified by the
amount of financing needed;5" indeed, the locality may require the asset
to be financed before the procedures for a referendum could be enacted.52
Other advantages for the government lessee include: (1) conservation of
current operating reserves; (2) contract terms within the framework of
existing state laws; (3) repayment schedules designed to match municipal
budgets; and (4) passage of all normal warranties and guarantees pro-
vided by the manufacturer to the locality.
5 3
43. See id. at 35; see also Bisk, supra note 4, at 523-24; Schickendantz, supra note 16, at
329-30.
44. Schickendantz, supra note 16, at 330.
45. See supra notes 25-34 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 54-72 and accompanying text.
47. "Lessors will be forced to bid among themselves to win the government lessee's busi-
ness. To some extent therefore, market competition will insure that the lessor's federal tax
savings will be passed on to the state or municipality." Bisk, supra note 4, at 523 n.15.
48. Municipal bonds are usually issued to finance large capital improvement projects and
have maturity or retirement schedules that span 15 years or more; very few fully
mature in less than 10 years. As a result, bond issues are often not suitable for financ-
ing equipment and other capital assets with useful lives of 10 years or less.
GUIDE, supra note 15, at 37.
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-180 (Repl. Vol. 1981).
51. See GUIDE, supra note 15, at 37.
52. Id.
53. See Schickendantz, supra note 16, at 330.
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The greatest concern to the investor/lessor involved in a lease-purchase
agreement is the tax-exempt status of the interest portion of the periodic
lease-purchase payments.5 Along with the rules, regulations, and proce-
dures promulgated by the Internal Revenue Service, the Internal Revenue
Code has established three criteria with which the lease-purchase agree-
ment must comply to receive tax-exempt treatment:55 (1) the government
lessee must be a state or political subdivision thereof;56 (2) the agreement
must be an obligation that is issued pursuant to the lessee's "borrowing
power" and must specifically identify the interest portion of the periodic
payments; 7 and (3) the lease must be structured as a conditional sale or
an installment purchase rather than as a true lease.58
First, under section 103 of the Internal Revenue Code, interest on any
"State or local bond" is not includable in gross income and, therefore, is
not subject to federal income tax.59 The term "State or local bond" is
further defined as "an obligation of a state or political subdivision
thereof." 0 "Political subdivision," in turn, is defined as "any division of
any State or local governmental unit which is a municipal corporation or
which has been delegated the right to exercise part of the sovereign power
of the unit."61 Three sovereign powers have been identified: (1) the power
to tax; (2) the power of eminent domain; and (3) the police power.2 If an
entity does not qualify for the tax-exemption as a political subdivision
under this definition, it may still qualify if the entity acts "on behalf of" a
state government or one of its political subdivisions.
Second, the lease-purchase agreement must be executed pursuant to
the government lessee's "borrowing power" in order to qualify as an "ob-
ligation" under section 103 of the Internal Revenue Code. 4 Thus, the in-
vestor/lessor must enter into the lease-purchase agreement on a voluntary
basis, rather than be compelled to take government compensation for an
exchanged asset, as would occur, for example, when the power of eminent
domain is exercised.65 Also, the lease-purchase contract must specifically
state that the periodic payments will include a portion designated as in-
54. See GUIDE, supra note 15, at 54.
55. Id.
56. See infra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
57. See infra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
58. See infra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
59. I.R.C. § 103(a) (1986). For the exceptions to this subsection, see infra note 71.
60. I.R.C. § 103(c)(1) (1986).
61. Treas. Reg. § 1.103-1(b) (amended 1972).
62. Rev. Rul. 77-164, 1977-1 C.B. 20, 21.
63. Treas. Reg. § 1.103-1(b) (amended 1972).
64. Kurtz Bros. v. Commissioner, 42 B.T.A. 561, 565 (1940).
65. "It disregards the whole purpose of the exemption to apply it to interest upon obliga-
tions of a state which it can compel a citizen to take in exchange for the fair value of his
property." Drew v. United States, 551 F.2d 85, 88 (5th Cir. 1977) (quoting United States
Trust Co. v. Anderson, 65 F.2d 575, 578 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 683 (1933)).
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terest that is distinguishable from principal."6
Third, in order for interest paid under a lease-purchase agreement to
be tax-exempt, the agreement must be structured as a conditional sales
contract rather than as a true lease."' The Internal Revenue Service has
established criteria for identifying a leasing arrangement as a conditional
sale rather than as a true lease."'
On August 27, 1986, Congress passed the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (the
"Act"),69 an extensive overhaul of the Internal Revenue Code. The Act
reorganized, amended, and partially repealed the rules governing tax ex-
emption for the interest on government obligations."0 The basic frame-
work for government bonds was retained, as was the traditional exclusion
from gross income of interest earned on government obligations whose
proceeds are used exclusively for governmental purposes.7 ' Thus, munici-
pal lease-purchase lessors will continue to enjoy tax-exempt interest in-
come. Indeed, the popularity of lease-purchasing may increase as other
forms of tax "sheltering" are eroded.7 2
C. Constitutional Debt Limitations and the Nonappropriation
Mechanism
State constitutional debt limitations restrict the amount of "debt" that
state and local governments may incur.7 3 Such restrictions on state bor-
rowing began in 1842 in response to various government financial deba-
cles which occurred during the 1830's and 1840's;7 4 the economic crisis of
1873-74 precipitated limits on municipal borrowing.7 5 Debt ceilings take
three principal forms:76 (1) a percentage of a region's assessed property
value;77 (2) a specified absolute sum;78 or (3) no debt whatsoever.79 Be-
66. Newlin Machinery Corp. v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 837, 842 (1957).
67. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8,042,143 (1980) (following Rev. Rul. 72-399, 1972-2 C.B. 73).
68. Rev. Rul. 55-540, 1955-2 C.B. 39, 41-42. For a discussion of this authority, see supra
note 27.
69. Pub. L. No. 99-514.
70. [1987] 2 Stand. Fed. Tax. Rep. (CCH) 1 1200.
71. Id. Bond interest will no longer be tax-exempt when it is derived from: (1) private
activity bonds that are not exempt as qualified bonds; (2) arbitrage bonds; or (3) state or
local bonds not issued in registered form. I.R.C. § 103(b)(1)-(3) (1986).
72. "The drastic curtailment of other forms of shelter will prevent use of most tax shelter
losses to offset wage, dividend and interest income .... This will leave tax exempt income
the only income excludable from tax computation." 2 PAINEWEBBER TAX REFORM REP. 2
(Sept. 3, 1986).
73. Bisk, supra note 4, at 525.
74. See Bowmar, The Anachronism Called Debt Limitation, 52 IOWA L. REv. 863, 863
(1967); see, e.g., R.I. CONsT. art. IV, § 13 (1842, repealed 1951).
75. See Williams & Nehemkis, Municipal Improvements as Affected by Constitutional
Debt Limitations, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 177, 177-78 (1937).
76. Bisk, supra note 4, at 525.
77. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONsT. art. IX, § 8.
78. See, e.g., R.I. CONsT. art. XXXI, § 1.
79. See, e.g., IDAHO CONST. art. VIII, § 3.
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cause state constitutions rarely define "debt,""0 that task has fallen to the
courts when municipal financing has faced judicial scrutiny. As a result,
an issue arises as to whether municipal lease-purchase agreements consti-
tute municipal "debt" so as to fall within the ambit of state constitutional
debt limitations. A majority of courts addressing this question have based
their decision on the presence or absence of a nonappropriation clause in
the lease-purchase contract."'
The nonappropriation clause, which is one of the more important iden-
tifying characteristics of the lease-purchase agreement, is a contractual
provision that allows the government lessee to terminate the agreement
by choosing not to appropriate funds for the periodic payments in a given
appropriation period.82 Because of this provision, the obligation created
by the lease-purchase agreement can be said to be payable out of current
operating expenses and, as such, not restricted by constitutional debt lim-
itations."' This basic premise is illustrated by State ex rel. Thomson v.
Giessel, 84 where the Supreme Court of Wisconsin considered three sepa-
rate municipal lease-purchase agreements, each containing a nonappro-
priation clause.8 5 The court, relying on the nonappropriation clauses, up-
held all three leases, stating that "no state debt is created where
payments are to be made solely at the state's option."86
A minority of states, which are represented by New Mexico in McKin-
ley v. Alamogordo Municipal School District Authority,87 hold unconsti-
tutional lease-purchase agreements in which the debt exceeds constitu-
tional limits, despite the presence of a nonappropriation clause. In
McKinley, the Supreme Court of New Mexico struck down a lease be-
tween a municipal school district as lessee and a municipal school district
building authority even though the district could terminate the lease at
the end of any given year, stating that "[t]he effort to circumvent the
constitutional restraints in the manner attempted cannot be upheld." ss
The nonappropriation mechanism ensures that the policy of constitu-
80. See, e.g., VA. CONsT. art. VII, § 10.
81. Compare Scroggs v. Kansas City, 499 S.W.2d 500 (Mo. 1973) (invalidating lease-
purchase agreement without nonappropriation clause) with St. Charles City-County Library
Dist. v. St. Charles Library Bldg. Corp., 627 S.W.2d 64, 67 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (validating
lease-purchase agreement with nonappropriation clause).
82. See GUIDE, supra note 15, at 30.
83. See, e.g., Teperich v. North Judson-San Pierre High School Bldg. Corp., 257 Ind. 516,
521, 275 N.E.2d 814, 817 (1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 921 (1972).
84. 271 Wis. 15, 72 N.W.2d 577 (1955).
85. Id. at 41, 72 N.W.2d at 590.
86. Id. at 40, 72 N.W.2d at 590.
87. 81 N.M. 196, 465 P.2d 79 (1969).
88. Id. at 201, 465 P.2d at 84.
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tional debt limitations, i.e., maintaining governmental fiscal responsibil-
ity, is furthered with respect to municipal lease-purchase agreements. By
allowing governing bodies to terminate the periodic payments without
penalty, the nonappropriation clause protects future taxpayers from cur-
rent fiscal recklessness, 89 and at the same time, allows current municipal
leaders to address the local government fiscal crisis. Jurisdictions which
adhere to the reasoning found in McKinley can only be said to be unrea-
sonably unsympathetic to the struggle of local officials to develop alterna-
tive means of needed financing.
II. THE VIRGINIA PERSPECTIVE
A. Background
Virginia follows Dillon's Rule,90 which states that the authority of local
governments is fixed by statute and is limited to those powers conferred
expressly or by necessary implication."1 Thus, Virginia local governments
must identify express statutory authority granting power to enter into
lease-purchase agreements as a lessee and, if the agreement involves a
"ground lease" of realty,92 as a lessor. In addition, the Constitution of
Virginia provides for limitations on local debt 93 which are similar to those
found in other states.9 4 Finally, if a ground lease is involved, the Code of
Virginia requires public hearings, 5 which should be considered by the
parties to a prospective lease-purchase agreement. Because the Code of
Virginia grants authority to act separately to counties on one hand, and
to cities and towns on the other, the remainder of this comment is organ-
ized in a similar fashion.
89. "[A]Ithough there is an expectation of continued appropriations by the legislature,
there is no prohibited state debt or pledge of credit if the legislature is not obligated to act."
State ex rel. W. Va. Resource Recovery-Solid Waste Disposal Auth. v. Gill, 323 S.E.2d 590,
595 (W. Va. 1984) (overruling State ex rel. Hall v. Taylor, 154 W. Va. 659, 178 S.E.2d 48
(1970) (invalidating a lease-purchase agreement despite presence of nonappropriation
clause)).
90. J. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 237 (5th ed.
1911).
91. See County Bd. v. Brown, 229 Va. 341, 344, 329 S.E.2d 468, 470 (1985).
92. See supra text accompanying note 28.
93. See VA. CONST. art. VII, § 10(a). This subsection prohibits Virginia cities and towns
from contracting debt in excess of 10% of the assessed value of the taxable real estate in the
locality. Virginia counties are prohibited from contracting any debt at all except through
special authority conferred by the general assembly. Id. § 10(b).
94. See supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
95. See VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-262 (Cum. Supp. 1986).
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B. Authority of Virginia Counties to Enter Into Lease-Purchase
Agreements
In County Board v. Brown,9 a Virginia county petitioned for a writ of
mandamus directing the county manager to carry out the provisions of a
lease-purchase agreement which required the county, as lessor, to lease
public land under a seventy-five year ground lease to a private developer.
The developer, in turn, was to construct improvements upon the leased
realty and lease office space in the improvements to the county. 7 The
Supreme Court of Virginia held that there was no statutory authority for
such an arrangement because, contrary to the county's assertion, the
Code of Virginia did not authorize a county to act as a lessor of its real
property.98
In reaction to Brown, the Virginia General Assembly amended section
15.1-262 to provide express statutory authority for a county to act as les-
sor of improved or unimproved publicly owned realty.9 In addition, the
Attorney General of Virginia has stated that this section now authorizes a
Virginia county to enter into a ground lease such as the one at issue in
Brown as a lessor, after conducting the requisite public hearing on the
matter.100 Section 15.1-262 also authorizes a county to acquire real prop-
erty by lease for any public purpose.'0 '
The Constitution of Virginia prohibits counties from incurring debt to
be paid from revenues not collectible in the current year except by cer-
tain specified means not relevant to lease-purchase agreements. 0 2 How-
ever, the Attorney General of Virginia has stated that lease-purchasd
agreements which are subject to an annual appropriation of the funds
necessary for the annual payments are constitutionally permissible. 0 3
The Supreme Court of Virginia has not ruled on the propriety of this
opinion. 0 4
There is no express power for a Virginia county to acquire personalty
by lease comparable to the power with respect to realty found in section
15.1-262. In the Virginia Attorney General's view, however, section 15.1-
96. 229 Va. 341, 329 S.E.2d 468 (1985).
97. Id. at 343-44, 329 S.E.2d at 469-70.
98. Id. at 346, 329 S.E.2d at 471. The code section at issue in Brown was at that time
codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-262 (Cure. Supp. 1984).
99. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-262 (Cum. Supp. 1986).
100. 1985-1986 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 70, 71.
101. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-262 (Cum. Supp. 1986).
102. VA. CONST. art. VII, § 10(b).
103. 1985-1986 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 70, 71. This condition is the so-called "nonappropria-
tion" clause. See supra notes 73-89 and accompanying text.
104. The opinions of the Attorney General, while entitled to due consideration, are advi-
sory in nature and are not binding on the Supreme Court of Virginia. See Brown, 229 Va. at
347, 329 S.E.2d at 472.
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105, dealing with the powers of county purchasing agents, implies this
power.1 0
5
Finally, it should be noted that Virginia counties qualify as tax-exempt
"political subdivisions ' because of their tax,"' eminent domain, 08 and
police powers.109
C. Authority of Virginia Cities and Towns to Enter Into Lease-
Purchase Agreements
Chapter 18 of Title 15.1 of the Code of Virginia provides an integrated
set of powers that the council of a city or town may exercise when the
general assembly specifically confers those powers by charter. 1 0 Among
those is the authority provided in section 15.1-897 for a city or town, as
lessee, to lease both real and personal property, but only if the general
assembly has placed the language of this section, or its equivalent, in the
city or town charter."' Likewise, section 15.1-847 grants to Virginia cities
and towns the authority to act as lessor of their real property. 2 More-
over, a city or town, like a county, may enter into a long-term lease-
purchase agreement as a lessee if the agreement contains a nonappropria-
tion mechanism. 113
The issue arises whether article VII, section nine of the Constitution of
Virginia and section 15.1-307 of the Code of Virginia-companion provi-
sions which limit the power of a city or town to franchise, lease, or sell its
real property-limit the power granted in section 15.1-847 to act as lessor
in the "ground lease" 1 4 portion of a lease-purchase agreement involving
the acquisition of realty. In addressing this issue, the Attorney General of
Virginia has opined that the limiting provisions of section 15.1-307, which
require advertising and receiving of bids, apply only where the city or
town grants a franchise.'
Finally, it should be noted that Virginia cities and towns, like counties,
qualify as tax-exempt "political subdivisions""'  because of their tax, 1 7
105. See 1985-1986 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 86, 89.
106. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
107. VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-95 (RepI. Vol. 1985).
108. Id. § 25-232.01 (Cum. Supp. 1986).
109. Id. § 15.1-131.7 (Repl. Vol. 1981).
110. 1985-1986 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 86, 88.
111. See VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-897 (Repl. Vol. 1981); see also 1985-1986 Op. Va. Att'y
Gen. 86, 88.
112. See VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-847 (Repl. Vol. 1981).
113. 1985-1986 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 86, 89; see supra notes 73-89 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
115. See 1975 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 533, 534.
116. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
117. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-841 (Rep. Vol 1981).
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eminent domain, 1 s and police powers. 119
III. CONCLUSION
Municipal lease-purchasing provides a vehicle to ease the current fiscal
crisis experienced by local governments nationwide, including those in
Virginia. Lessors under lease-purchase agreements enjoy tax-exempt in-
terest, 2 0 while government lessees benefit from increased financial flexi-
bility and, at the same time, avoid the risk and expense of a bond issue.1"
In addition, the nonappropriation framework incorporated into most
lease-purchase agreements maintains governmental fiscal responsibility
and satisfies state constitutional debt limitations in a majority of
jurisdictions.1 22
Virginia cities and towns are statutorily authorized to enter into lease-
purchase agreements to acquire either realty or personalty, so long as the
agreement is conditioned by the presence of a nonappropriation clause.
12 3
Thus, Virginia has joined a majority of states in allowing local govern-
ments to employ municipal lease-purchasing to ease their fiscal difficul-
ties. Moreover, the nonappropriation mechanism, which allows localities
to terminate the arrangement without penalty, preserves the integrity of
Virginia's constitutional debt safeguard.
R. Webb Moore
118. Id. § 25.232.01 (Cum. Supp. 1986).
119. Id. § 15.1-131.7 (Repl. Vol. 1981).
120. See supra notes 54-72 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 43-53 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 96-119 and accompanying text.
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